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ABSTRACT 
This study has analyzed success in information operations: what it is and how it 
is determined. The research was carried out as a literature study and is limited to 
encompassing the military part of information operations. The main sources have 
been U.S., British and Swedish information operations doctrines. Success in 
information operations is discussed from two perspectives: the evaluative and the 
predictive. According to doctrines, success from an evaluative perspective is 
determined by measuring post-action effects on the target.  
It is problematic to determine success from the predictive perspective. 
This conclusion is based on the lack of analytical tools and/or processes to 
determine the effort needed, and the current lack of procedures to coherently 
connect operational objectives with tactical tasks in the information environment. 
In order to pursue this beyond the initial results of the thesis, success in the 
maritime domain is briefly analyzed and the outcome of the analysis is adjusted 
and applied to the information environment. Several areas are presented where 
the adjusted concept of operations could benefit the information environment; the 
most significant improvement would be the ability to predict probability of success 
prior to an operation. Lastly, directions for further studies are presented. 
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In “classic” kinetic warfare, success can be measured with help from 
statistics and empirical knowledge, e.g., if 20 rounds of small arms ammunition 
are fired towards a prone soldier at least one will hit based on previous 
experiences. Success can also be measured by analyzing changes on a 
battlefield map. When a hill or a town falls in the hands of one side, the map will 
be redrawn and success can quite easily be measured by using a ruler. 
Eventually the government of a state can determine the need to surrender just by 
analyzing the map. There are more ways to measure success, but they all have 
one thing in common: the methods are largely quantitative. 
These facts facilitate the possibility to accurately, and in a timely fashion, 
determine progress toward the desired end state, i.e., the actual change of 
physical and/or cognitive situation in comparison with the desired change. The 
ability to measure outcome is a central process in military planning because 
without knowing which of the changes a related action has created, it is almost 
impossible to understand if the actions were successful or a failure; it is almost 
as impossible to create a good understanding about the next step in an 
operation. You have to understand where you are in order to know where you 
should go next to achieve your goals. The two aspects of success, the evaluation 
after an event has occurred and the necessity to be able to calculate and predict 
with a degree of probability how you must behave in order to succeed, will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter IV. 
The outcome of an information operation often does not provide direct 
quantitatively measurable answers for an evaluation. In most cases, changes in 
the information environment cannot be measured in the same fashion as with 
kinetic actions in warfare. The present thesis will address this difference in the 
discussion about how success is determined in information operations.  
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The visible spectrum, or any other spectrum, used in information 
operations cannot be captured or incorporated within a state´s borders, and it 
holds no nationality. But, at the same time, information operations has a lethal 
ingredient, both from direct physical destruction of communication components 
and indirectly because of the change of behavior in an opposing force due to the 
effects of an information operation. This duality regarding non-lethal and lethal 
components in information operations uniquely differentiates this environment in 
comparison to the traditional combat domains.  
Based on the uniqueness of the characteristics, the theory around 
information operations differs from the traditional combat domains and this has 
led to the development of a separate set of planning guidance and procedures 
military actions within the information environment. 
Despite the unique elements in its nature, an information operation is 
seldom an isolated act of warfare. Instead, it is carried out in conjunction with 
other efforts in order to be able to achieve the desired end state. As is common 
with these other efforts, we must ask how are the criteria for success determined, 
i.e., how are end state objectives in the information operations environment 
reached? Is it possible to merge different staff procedures together so that the 
outcome is understandable, usable and compatible within these procedures and 
with the procedures in other war fighting areas? Warfare produces several 
windows of opportunity, but they all exist for a limited period and the 
opportunities must be exploited without hesitation to be able to take advantage of 
favorable situations. There is simply not enough time available to deal with 
interpretation issues between two planning methods.  
This thesis will try to answer the fundamental question of what is success 
in information operations; furthermore, it will examine if it could be beneficial to 
use a traditional combat domain’s basic ideas in order to better understand and 
interpret the term success when conducting and evaluating information 
operations. 
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 II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH METHOD 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In 2009, the author was stationed in Pristina, Kosovo, assigned as the 
Executive Officer (XO) for the Military Civilian Advisory Division (MCAD) in KFOR 
headquarters. During this assignment, the KFOR headquarters introduced effects 
based approach to operations (EBAO), a method to measure the effects actions 
have on a society, instead of measuring explicitly the outcome of military actions 
as is done in traditional planning. MCAD recruits, organizes and trains the 
Kosovo Security Force (KSF), established in 2008, as a part of the Kosovo status 
settlement.1 The author participated with MCAD in different events to introduce 
and establish the new staff method. One of the issues that were especially 
intriguing was the question of how to measure progress in operations other than 
war, as the MCAD’s focus was to reach initial operational capability as soon as 
possible. Some areas were easier to measure. For example, the number of 
members successfully recruited and vetted by a certain date. Others areas were 
more difficult. For example, to measure how successful a firefighting unit was to 
conduct firefighting, which is one of the core capabilities for KSF. In the more 
difficult areas, quantitative performance, i.e., number of repetitions, was 
measured instead of the effectiveness of each unit. Evaluation was based on 
how many times the members had conducted a related exercise, not on how 
successful they were carrying out the tasks at each exercise. The results did not 
reflect the skills and effectiveness of the units. So why this introduction? When 
studying information operations literature that this author’s previous questions 
and thoughts about measurements of effectiveness are still valid and posed a 
challenge when searching for answers in the literature of what success is in 
information operations. Similarly, this was found in the challenge to identify, 
                                            
1 United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo, “The Comprehensive proposal for 
Kosovo Status Settlement,” (n.d.), http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html. 
 4
observe and evaluate adequate parameters in situations where measurements 
cannot physically tell the difference. If the objective is obtain the unit’s capacity, 
evaluating the internal performance is not enough. To obtain a true answer, the 
effect the operation has on the opposing force(s) must be included. For instance, 
it does not matter how much jamming an electronic warfare unit can carry out if 
the adversary force is operating on frequencies outside the jammer’s coverage. 
The question of success is somewhat overlooked in military literature. 
Obviously, the overarching goal when engaging in a physical conflict is victory. 
Otherwise, warfare would be a cynical waste of human sacrifices. Therefore, one 
would expect that special attention would be spent on this very basic question. 
Instead, most discussions about success are implied in other terms, such as 
aims, objectives or a desired end state. The ability to establish criteria for, and 
frame, success into a realistic context is crucial when determining objectives in 
the sense that it has to be achievable; otherwise, it can be viewed simply as 
dreaming.  
Compared to sea, land and even air warfare, information warfare is a 
young discipline and, due to the nature of information, it is difficult to frame into a 
generally accepted definition. The information environment, however, shares 
some of its characteristics with the air and sea domains. All of them exist without 
borders. In addition, they cannot be fortified or seized more than in the abstract 
sense that the air above and the sea surrounding a nation belong to the nation.  
The lack of clear answers and guidelines in the analyzed literature led to 
the topic: what is success in information operations and, furthermore, how is it 
determined? One thing that became apparent at the start of research is the 
complexity the subject offers. The world of today is dependent on a seamless 
information flow and this opens up the possibility to exploit the information 
environment for various unethical and criminal actions. In this broad perspective, 
information operations affect all parts of a society and, if trying to encompass and 
analyze such a broad target, it gets complex and even problematic to 
contextualize or understand. For this subject, it can also be argued that this 
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complexity is a problem in itself. The term friction is used in traditional warfare to 
explain why a simple laid out plan encounters problems and sometimes comes to 
a full stop. The military theorist Clausewitz stated: “Everything in war is simple, 
but the simplest thing is difficult.”2 The term friction is therefore commonly used in 
military planning to underline the importance of keeping a plan simple in order to 
enhance the possibility of success. This praxis has been applied to traditional 
warfare theories and is reflected in doctrines and manuals. This leads to the idea 
of using experience from the domains to find a different answer to the thesis; to 
explore if this is a feasible approach and if such an examination would improve 
the ability to determine success if a “doctrinal package” from a domain should be 
applied to the information environment. For this thesis, the domain examined and 
applied shall be the maritime domain. 
Based on the above mentioned, the study will be focused on the primary 
research question: 
How is success determined in information operations?  
To answer this question, three related questions must also be answered: 
 What is success in military operations? 
 What is success in information operations? 
 With regard to the environmental similarities between the maritime 
and the information environment, can general concepts of naval 
theory be adapted to determining success in information 
operations?  
  
                                            
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 119.  
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B. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The study analyzes how success is determined in information operations 
based on literature sources selected to represent a broad theoretical foundation. 
The U.S., British and Swedish information operation doctrines are the three main 
pillars examined.  
The first two chapters present the background, the research questions, 
and different aspects of framing the subject into a suitable format. Chapter III 
discusses several essential terms related to the research questions in order to 
establish a solid foundation for the thesis and to deepen the understanding for 
the expressions commonly used throughout the text. Chapter IV starts with a 
discussion about success in information operations. Thereafter, the discussion 
focuses on how success is determined according to the chosen literature. The 
thesis then discusses success in maritime operations and, lastly, the maritime 
concept of operation is applied to the information environment. Chapter V 
summarizes the findings of this study and suggests areas of future research. 
C. RESEARCH METHOD 
The research is conducted as a literature study. The area of interest for 
the thesis is large; in order not to overlook already existing knowledge about the 
topic, the natural first step was to start from the beginning, i.e., to look into 
available sources covering information operations. 
A qualitative analysis of the texts was chosen rather than a quantitative 
analysis. Briefly, the difference between the two methods can be described as 
“qualitative data involves words and quantitative data involves numbers.”3 The 
research was organized and conducted by analyzing and comparing multiple 
sources, with an emphasis on the contextual meaning of each text, not on 
comparing how often a looked for expression was mentioned in a text. The study 
                                            
3 Colorado State University, “The Qualitative versus Quantitative Debate,” (n.d.), 
http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/gentrans/pop2f.cfm. 
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does not involve any quantitative comparative analysis between studied 
literatures. Therefore, a qualitative research method was chosen as it better suits 
the taken approach of the study and hopefully this choice has enhanced the 
quality of the research, and ultimately the thesis. 
The findings for this method are by nature strictly theoretical and must be 
followed up with practical tests to validate the results. This will be discussed in 
Chapter V where areas for further research are suggested.  
D. LIMITATIONS  
Limitations will be used to frame the study with the purpose of maintaining 
the focus of the text and avoiding deviation from the objectives. The limitations 
are applied in the following areas: 
 Information operations is a broad term and covers all stages of a 
conflict. It is a tool that can be used within all instruments of power 
available within part of a conflict, not only as a supporting operation 
for a traditional military operation.4 Trying to embrace all situations 
where information operations can be applied is a task too large for 
a thesis. In order to make the topic manageable and narrow the 
area of research, the thesis is limited to cover only the part of 
information operations that involves the use of military forces. 
 Judicial issues connected to information operations will not be 
covered. It is an area which, in the future, will be framed by legal 
and other boundaries and restrictions.5 The conclusions will not 
encompass any proposed judicial restrictions.  
                                            
4 The Instruments of power are usually referred to the acronym DIME: Diplomatic, 
Informational, Military and Economic. For further information see, for example: Command & Staff 
College Distance Education Program, (AY 11) National & International Security studies, vol. I 2–
2. DIME will also be discussed in Chapter III. 
5 Edward Halpin, Philippa Trevorrow, David Webb, Steve Wrigth, Eds., Cyberwar, Netwar 
and Revolution in Military Affairs (New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 139–140. 
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 The British, Swedish and U.S. perspectives of information 
operations will be covered. The author of this work has no ambition 
to include all cultural differences affecting information operations.  
 There are significant differences in resources between the three 
countries used in the research. This difference, however, is 
believed to be beneficial for the outcome of the thesis. Nation-
specific text, i.e., doctrinal work, is written based on available 
information power resources and presents different perspectives.  
E. SOURCES 
Information operations can be used to shape information used by a third 
party or to mislead the same. Therefore, in order to be true to the subject of the 
thesis it is necessary to conduct a critical survey of the used sources. The 
purpose of this survey is to create a better understanding about the biases and 
weaknesses of each source. The sources can be divided into four sub-
categories: 
1. Doctrines and Other Defense Publications  
The study is primarily based on official publications from the United 
States, United Kingdom and Sweden. There are several reasons for choosing 
publications from these three countries: 
 The first is that they do not create any language problem for the 
author. Non-English official military publications are seldom or 
never translated into other languages and trying to use such 
sources would create severe difficulties for the author. 
 Empirically, the United Kingdom and the United States have been 
very influential both in general warfare development as well as in 
information operations development.  
 They are written from three different power perspectives. The 
United States is currently the only military superpower in the world. 
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The United Kingdom is a major player in the NATO alliance and 
has had extensive experience in conducting war. Sweden is, from 
the military perspective, a peripheral country. It has not been 
involved in a war since 1814 (the date does not include 
participation in international missions such as KFOR or ISAF) and 
is not a member of any military alliance. Together these three 
represent a broad perspective on doctrinal work. 
2. Internet Sources 
The Internet has forever changed the management and exchange of 
information. Humanity can share information at a speed previously impossible6 to 
achieve, and the cost for a user to spread and receive information is uniquely 
low. All that is needed is access to an Internet connected device, a service 
provided free in libraries all over the world.7 The introduction of the Internet has 
also changed the control of information flow. Before the Internet, there were 
usually several layers of filtering before information went public. Any piece of 
information published through the traditional information channels such as TV, 
radio, press or a library, were filtered through a publisher, a journalist, a TV 
producer or the equivalent. Today anyone can log on to the Internet and 
distribute unfiltered information without any requirements that the information be 
fact checked or validated. Additionally, applying governmental control on the 
Internet cannot be done without at the same time enforcing censorship. On the 
contrary, everybody with access to the Internet can contribute without any 
censorship or influence from a third party, such as an editor or a publisher. It is 
even possible to bypass your nation’s regulations by using a server situated in a 
foreign country.  
                                            
6 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 3-80, 
Information Operations (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2002), 1-1. 
7 Douglas Browning, Michael Covington, and Melody Mauldin Covington, Dictionary of 
Computer and Internet Terms, 10th ed. (Hauppauge, NY: Barron’s Educational Series, 2009),  
s.v. “Internet.”  
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The unfiltered contribution is one of the main attractions but, on the other 
hand, it is also one of the main obstacles when searching for information on the 
Internet. Information is easy accessible, often by simply using one of the search 
engines, and they usually present search results containing more web pages 
than you can possibly browse through. The need to examine the webpages used 
in a scientific text is, therefore, even higher than for printed or broadcast media. 
Initially a thorough examination of the origin of the webpage is necessary. 
Registration and use of a domain name that sounds trustworthy or is very similar 
to a trustworthy page is easily accomplished. Typing www.whitehouse.org in a 
browser’s address field will result in being directed to Ron Paul’s official 2012 
presidential campaign website. Typing www.whitehouse.gov8 will result in being 
directed to the president of the United States. The small change of appendix to 
the domain name is enough to redirect the user in an unwanted direction and 
might be confusing.  
If a web page passes the first step of evaluation and is concluded to be 
trustworthy, it is still necessary to examine if the information is obsolete, what the 
sources are, and if the actual information is altered from the original source. It is 
also crucial to find the reason why the information is published on the Internet 
and to determine the publisher’s intentions. 
The Internet has several components including the World Wide Web 
(WWW), which consists of more than 360 million websites,9 where each has 
multiple web pages. Finding the information you need on a credible web page is 
crucial when using Internet-based resources in a study. The use of the Internet 
has been limited to three types of sources due to the aforementioned reasons: 
 Official publications retrieved from official websites. 
                                            
8 Both of the web page examples were accessed March, 15, 2012. 
9 Howmanyarethere? “How Many websites Are There on the Internet?” June 22, 2011. 
http://howmanyarethere.net/how-many-websites-are-there-on-the-Internet/ 
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o An example is The British defence doctrine where the online 
PDF version of the book is used. 
 Online published books.  
o An example is the online Gutenberg project, which offers 
over 38,000 eBooks previously published by bona fide 
publishers. These are as authentic as the hard copy. 
 Regular websites. Internet-based sources will be used restrictively 
and thoroughly evaluated. Only if the source is considered 
trustworthy will the information be used.  
With all the information available on the Internet It would be inefficient and 
almost ignorant to not to use it. Information from the Internet must, however, be 
used with care and with a lot of common sense. 
3. Published Material (Books, Articles) 
The context for information operations is expanding and there is almost a 
“best before”-date on published material. Therefore, a rule of thumb has been 
mostly to select books that are primarily no more than ten years old for the 
research. This helps ensure that the latest developments in the field are covered. 
An additional benefit is that the books fulfill today’s requirements regarding 
academic standards, including full presentation of used sources and texts that 
are usually footnoted. 
That said, the literature list also consists of a few books older than the 
“best before date.” They are used because of their central position, and they still 
have an impact on contemporary military theory. Many of these books do not 
fulfill the academic requirements we expect from modern academic literature, but 
they all are internationally recognized as standards of work in their respective 
fields and are, therefore, recognized as academically solid. 
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III.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND 
FRAMEWORK DISCUSSION  
This chapter will discuss fundamental definitions, their origins, different 
views, and which definition the thesis will use. The aim of the chapter is to 
establish a solid base for further discussion and conclusions.  
A. PURPOSE 
“All right,” said Deep Thought. “The answer to the great question ...” 
“Is” 
“Forty-two,” said Deep Thought, with infinite majesty and calm. ... 
“Forty-two!” yelled Loonquawl. “Is that all you’ve got to show for 
seven and a half million years’ work?” 
“I checked it very thoroughly,” said the computer, “and that quite 
definitely is the answer. I think the problem, to be quite honest with 
you, is that you’ve never actually known what the question is.”10 
Deep Thought, i.e., the name of the computer, provides an answer that 
highlights an important aspect: the need to actually analyze and understand the 
question the study revolves around. If you have read the book “The Hitchhiker’s 
Guide to the Galaxy,” you should learn from Deep Thought. Analyze and 
understand your own posed question(s). 
The problem statement contains three fundamental terms: information, 
information operations and success.11 Moreover, the term operations calls for 
some explanation as it is used in different contexts and with different meanings in 
military literature, doctrines, handbooks and field manuals. These terms will be 
 
 
                                            
10 Douglas Adams, The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy (London: PAN 1979), 187. 
11 See Chapter II. A. for the present thesis research question. 
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qualitatively analyzed with the aim to define the main research question even 
better and achieve a good understanding regarding the central terms of the 
study. 
B. INFORMATION AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
Information is the oxygen of the modern age. It seeps through the 
walls topped by barbed wire, it wafts across the electrified borders. 
—Ronald Reagan, U.S. President 1981–1989 
1. Data, Information and Knowledge 
Everything around us is information. A house is a physical construction, 
which can be inhabited or used for other purposes, and at the same time it 
represents a piece of data that this is a house and it can be used for different 
purposes. According to Checkland and Holwell in their book, “Information, 
Systems and Information Systems—Making Sense of the Field,” the process of 
data transition into information occurs when: “data is transformed into information 
when meaning is attributed to it.”12 This is a human mental activity and is a 
prerequisite for data to be turned into useful information. Assume that an 
observer has seen a house (any house) prior to being confronted with 
information about another house. He/she can understand and relate the new 
information to the previous information. Due to the existing knowledge, sense 
can be made of the new information. There is no need to enter or even see the 
house to understand the new information. The information can be connected to 
related information and the larger information structure leads to knowledge.13 
The process in which data is turned into knowledge and understanding is shown 
in Figure 1. 
                                            
12 Peter Checkland and Sue Holwell, Information, Systems, and Information Systems-Making 
Sense of the Field (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 95. 




Figure 1. Information hierarchy14 
 
Information technology has changed the way we can collect data and 
process it into information and knowledge. With the use of very sophisticated 
information technologies, today we can collect information about the Big Bang 
origin of the universe that occurred approximately 13.7 billion years ago. 
Moreover, modern information technologies enable the spread of information at a 
speed inconceivable a few years ago. Unfortunately, the technologies can also 
be, and have been, used to spread rumors, lies and malicious software, which 
                                            
14 From: United States, Marine Corps University, Operational Art, Course Book & Readings 






















can be exploited, creating vulnerabilities that must be protected.15  This is a very 
old technique (except for malicious software), but the introduction of information 
technologies has increased the speed with which bad information can be 
distributed worldwide.  
In the military field, data are both collected by direct observation or via 
sensors and presented on a man-machine interface, e.g., a computer screen or 
on a radar plan position indicator. In modern warfare, staff and commanding 
officers seldom encounter the enemy face-to-face. They are often dependent on 
timely and accurate information provided by sensors and various technologies 
within the information environment. This situation has been prevalent in the 
navies and air forces of the world since the introduction of radar. Up until recent 
times, human interactions have been the most efficient method of information 
sharing for land-based operations. With the introduction of new information 
technologies, armies are increasingly using the information environment to 
support decision-making. The result is that modern commanders, especially in 
the higher echelons, are dependent on the information environment and 
technology when planning and conducting operations.16  In the military field, 
information is also used to influence the will of an adversary through 
psychological operations (PSYOP), deception, electronic warfare (EW) and 
computer network operations (CNO).17 
Information is often borderless and is seldom restricted by physical 
obstacles such as water or continents. Information technology has added to this 
borderless nature of information. For instance, you can be anywhere in the world 
and still have instant U.S. stock market updates. From the military perspective, 
                                            
15 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 3-80, 
Information Operations (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2002), 1-1. 
16 Wayne, P. Hughes Jr., Fleet Tactics, Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval 
Institute, 1986), 171. 
17 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 3-80, 
Information Operations, (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2002), 2-6. 
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this can be a complicating factor. An information campaign could be initiated from 
a country that has no part or national interest in a conflict. Groups or individuals 
within non-participating countries might have an influence on events between 
participants. It is worth mentioning that there are legal considerations that might 
occur when a nation responds to an information operation initiated by individuals 
or non-official groups within a country.18 
2. Information Power 
Joint Publication JP 3–13 “Information Operations” states, “Information is 
a strategic resource vital to national security. Dominance of the information 
environment is a reality that extends to the Armed Forces of the U.S. at all 
levels.”19 But, what does “strategic resource” mean? Clausewitz’s studies on 
warfare are a good starting point to explain information power on the strategic 
level: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”20 If the power of 
information distributed through one or several information operations can avoid 
engaging kinetic warfare and thus minimizing physical destruction, the 
information must be considered to have strategic importance.21  
On an operational level, the power of information is evident through 
numerous historical examples. Information operations were used extensively 
prior to and during the D-Day invasion of France, which had the effect that 
German forces were misallocated and had their focus on areas other than the 
actual landing beaches.22 The lack of understanding of information power was a 
reason why U.S. forces halted combat operations in Fallujah in April of 2004.  
                                            
18 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, “Information Operations,” 
(Washington, D.C, 2006), I-6. 
19 Ibid., I-3. 
20 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Ed: Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 87. 
21 G.J. David Jr., T.R. McKeldin III, (Ed.), Ideas as Weapons, Influence and Perception in 
Modern Warfare” (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc., 2009), 116. 
22 William B. Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler, the Normandy Deception (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 1993), chapter 11 and 24. 
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Marines won virtually every combat engagement throughout the 
battle and did so within the established rules of engagement. The 
missing element was an overall integrated information component 
to gain widespread support of significant influencers and to prepare 
key publics for the realities of the battle plan.23 
Information is powerful enough to start and stop conflicts; it can be used to 
influence and change people’s will, attitudes, beliefs and behavior.24 The armed 
forces of today are all dependent on integrated command and control systems in 
order to handle large amounts of information provided by increasingly 
sophisticated and highly sensitive sensors. If an adversary can interfere and alter 
information the damage can be substantial, and as discussed earlier, be the 
reason why a kinetic operation succeeds or fails.25  
3. Information Environment 
The information environment is a metaphysical space that consists of a 
physical dimension, an informational dimension and a cognitive dimension. This 
space defines the boundaries for the information area of operations. The term 
environment is taken from the Joint Publication JP 3-13 “Information Operations.” 
The other environments where war fighting takes place, sea, air, land and space 
are named “domains” and this change of terminology might confuse  a reader 
when studying the different doctrines.26 In order to be consistent, the U.S. 
information operation doctrine’s term “environment” will be used. The 
components included in the information environment and how they are related to 
each other are presented in Table 1. 
                                            
23 G.J. David Jr., T.R. McKeldin III, ed., Ideas as Weapons, Influence and Perception in 
Modern Warfare (Dulles, VA:  Potomac Books Inc., 2009), 267. 
24 Anthony R. Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, Advances and Future Progress 
(New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2007), 297. 
25 Försvarsmakten, Handbok Informationsoperationer (Stockholm: HKV, M7739–352014, 
2008), 15. 
26 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 
(Washington, D.C., 2011), IV-11. 
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THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
Physical 
Dimension 
 Where the information environment overlaps 
with the physical world 
 Information systems and networks 
 Key Characteristics: computers and 





 Where information is collected, processed, 
disseminated, stored and protected 
 Dual nature – information itself and the medium 
 Key characteristics: information content and 
flow, information quality 





 Where human decision making takes place 
 Dimension of intangibles. such as morale, unit 
cohesion, public opinion and situational 
awareness 
 Key Characteristics: perception , emotions, 
awareness and understanding 
 
Table 1. The information environment27 
4. Definition of Information 
The U.S. Joint Publication JP 3–13 “Information Operations” defines 
information as: 
1.  Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form 
2.  The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the 
 known conventions used in their representation28 
The first definition relates to the bottom step in Figure 1, Information 
Hierarchy. The second part of the definition is particularly interesting as it 
                                            
27From: United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2006), I-2. 
28 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2006), GL-9. 
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recognizes the cognitive interpretation of data. There is a human factor to take 
into consideration when discussing information. All humans have their own set of 
knowledge, experience and capabilities that affect the person’s interpretation of a 
received piece of data. 
One of the cornerstones for information operations is the revolutionary 
capability to transfer huge amounts of data at a very high speed, a capability that 
is evolving continuously. This latest technological development, combined with 
the very traditional involvement of the cognitive dimension as soon as information 
is shared between two persons, are two of the main ingredients used in the 
information environment and information operations. Therefore, the JP 3-13 
definition of information will be used as it encompasses both technology and 
human interactions.  
C. OPERATIONS, OPERATIONAL LEVEL AND OPERATIONAL ART 
Military activities exist on different levels involving different people, from 
the senior national leadership to the soldier or the seaman carrying out the 
orders that originally emanates from strategic objectives to win the war. There 
are three generally accepted levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.29 
Sometimes the strategic level is divided into two sub-levels—the grand strategic 
and the military strategic levels—in order to allow for a more precise discussion. 
Whether you accept a three or a four level definition, the strategic level is 
generally accepted to be the highest level of warfare.30 
There are no strict boundaries between the levels; they offer a generalized 
description of activities and responsibilities at each level. Every commander must 
bear in mind that action on one level might have a significant impact on the other 
levels. Dividing into levels facilitates planning on each level to be more precise in 
                                            
29 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2011), I-12. 
30 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01, 
British Defence Doctrine (Swindon: Ministry of Defence,2001), 1–3. 
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establishing desired end-states, the ways in which they are to be achieved, and 
the means necessary to achieve them.31 The relationship between levels is 
visualized in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Levels of war32 
 
1. Strategic Level 
The strategic level translates the political goals to military objectives and 
coordinates the instruments of national power so that a state’s efforts are 
synchronized and integrated in order to achieve theater, national, and/or 
multinational objectives.33  
2. Operational Level and Operational Art 
The operational level is the level in which military campaigns are 
designed, planned and executed. This is carried out by using operational art. i.e., 
                                            
31 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01, 
British Defence Doctrine (Swindon: Ministry of Defence,2001), 1–3. 
32 From United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 0-
01, British Defence Doctrine (Swindon: Ministry of Defence,2001), 1–4. 
33 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations 













the combined skills, creativity, knowledge and experience of commanders and 
staff on the operational level. Strategy is translated into tactics on this level.34 
3. Tactical Level 
This is the level at which the actual fighting takes place. Tactics is the art 
of the organized deployment of forces for battle or direct support for the units 
engaged in battle in order to achieve military objectives. The objectives are 
translated into tasks or activities for the units.35 The tactical level also covers 
non-combat activities in support of planning and operations.36 
4. Operations 
The term “operations” encompasses all actions and engagements carried 
out by a military unit independently on the level of war that relates to the 
operation. As an example, Operation “Iraqi Freedom” involved actions and 
activities on all levels of war. The term “operation” is described by the U.S. Joint 
Publication 3-0 “Joint Operations” as “Operations generally involve military action 
or the accomplishment of a strategic, operational, or tactical, service, training, or 
administrative military mission.”37 Note that information operations are level-less, 
even though most of their planning is carried out on the operational level. The 
actual actions are almost entirely carried out by units at the tactical level. 
5. Campaign 
A campaign can be described as the glue that connects the levels of war 
together and forms a unified effort on the operational level in order to reach the 
                                            
34 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2011), I-13. 
35 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01, 
British Defence Doctrine (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2001), 1–3. 
36 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2011), I-14. 
37 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2011), I-14. 
 23
desired end-state of the campaign. According to the U.S. doctrine for 
“Campaigning” a campaign is a “series of military related operations aimed at 
accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and 
space.”38 British doctrine uses the NATO definition, which is “A set of military 
operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given 
time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air 
forces.”39 The major difference is NATO’s emphasis on the combined effort in a 
campaign, and the NATO emphasis solely on the strategic objective. 
Generally, a campaign is sequentially constructed as follows: Units 
engaged in the campaign carry out activities or operations whose intended 
consequences contribute to reach the supporting effects. One or several 
supporting effect(s) contributes to decisive conditions that are identified as 
necessary to achieve a campaign objective. The campaign end-state is reached 
when all of the campaign objectives have been achieved. 40If the campaign(s) 
was properly planned and implemented, then the end result will be mission 
success. 
Figure 3 shows a sequential buildup of a campaign and how the different 
levels of war contributes towards the strategic objectives: 
                                            
38 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for 
Campaign Planning (Washington, D.C., 2002), GL-3. 
39 NATO, AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, (English and French),  (NATO 
standardization agency (NSA),  NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 2008),  2-C-1, s.v. “Campaign” 
40 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Doctrine Publication 01, 




Figure 3 From activity to strategic objectives41 
 
Information operations must be integrated into the campaign, from the 
activities on the lowest level up, as a part of the campaign end-state.42 However, 
a military campaign should not be confused with an information campaign.  
While similar to a military campaign, an information campaign is a 
combined effort within the information environment to reach mainly strategic 
objectives. According to the British Doctrine “Joint Warfare Publication 3–80, 
Information Operations” an information campaign attempts to “Co-ordinate output 
of all government activity undertaken to influence decision-makers in support of 
                                            
41 After: United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Doctrine Publictation 
01, Second Edition, Campaigning (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2008), 3-10. 
42 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for 
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policy objectives, while protecting one’s own decision-makers.”43 U.S. Joint 
Publication 3–13 “Information Operations” does not use the term campaign to 
describe a series of related information operations. Instead, the U.S. doctrine 
uses information operations as the unified term for efforts in the information 
environment.44  
According to the British doctrine, an information campaign is a cross 
agency effort, and a military information operation contributes to the overall 
objectives defined in the information campaign.45 
The expression information campaign is also widely used in areas outside 
the military community, for instance when discussing the combined effort in 
advertisement. This aspect of the definition is not included in this study. 
D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
1. Introduction to Information Operations 
All human beings use social influence to “direct, coordinate, and influence 
other member of the species.”46 The reason for the social influence differs. A 
teacher’s main occupation is to share information in order to spread knowledge 
to the next generation. Politicians try to share their visions and goals for the 
nation so that voters have a good understanding about the alternatives to choose 
from on election day. Advertising in virtually any medium is considered perfectly 
legitimate even though this is an apparent attempt to influence the targeted 
audience to change a behavior or to induce a greater willingness to buy a 
product. These are just a few examples where information is used to influence 
                                            
43 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 3-80, 
Information Operations (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2002) I-2. 
44 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2006) I-8. 
45 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 3-80, 
Information Operations (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2002) iii. 
46 Anthony R. Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, Advances and Future Progress 
(N.Y: Psychology Press, 2007), 17. 
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the receiver’s cognitive domain in order to achieve a change of attitude and 
behavior. The military’s use of social influence does not differ from the civilian 
use, in the sense that the will and capability of an adversary is the main focus for 
the efforts. However, the terminology and the concepts of social influence in a 
military context have been adjusted so that they fit in with the rest of the military 
community.  
The use of information in military operations is as old as warfare itself. 
World War II introduced and enhanced the development of machines handling 
data, such as radio communications technologies, radar, and machines capable 
of carrying out computations for calculating projectile trajectories and code 
breaking.47 This led to the “second industrial revolution,” also known as the 
information revolution, and the beginning of the information age in the early 
1960s.48 All predictions today about the future point towards a continuation of 
what we see in the growth of information sharing and electronic interactions and 
connections with hardware that doubles its capacity every two years.49  
Information operations are, in comparison with the other military activities, 
a new phenomenon. Information warfare as an aspect of contemporary warfare 
started to receive academic attention in the early 1980s and the area is still under 
development.50 This has led to discussions of how to label the subject, especially 
the core term “information operations.” Moreover, some literature uses the term 
“information warfare,” seemingly with the same meaning as “information 
operations.” Studying literature covering the subject can sometimes be confusing 
                                            
47 Martin Van Crevled, Technology and War, from 2000 B.C to the Present (New York: The 
Free Press, 1991), 267–268. 
48 Peter Checkland and Sue Holwell, Information, Systems, and Information Systems- 
Making Sense of the Field (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 4. 
49 The hardware development pace prediction is taken from Intel’s co-founder Gordon Moore 
and is commonly referred to as “Moore’s Law.”  
Intel “Moore’s Law Inspires Intel Innovation” (n.d.), 
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/silicon-innovations/moores-law-technology.html  
50 Edwin Leigh Armistead, Information Warfare: Separating Hype From Reality (Dulles, VA: 
Potomac Books, 2007), 97. 
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and calls for clarification to create a better understanding of the information 
operations framework and terminology. 
2. The Purpose of Information Operations 
Combat effectiveness of a military actor is a function of three pillars:51 
 Physical factors 
 Morale factors 
 Conceptual factors 
Physical factors consist of military units, personnel and other military 
resources, and will not be discussed further. Information operations aim to 
influence an adversary’s will, which is a component of the morale factors, and 
capability, which is a component of the conceptual factors.  
 Information operations are focused at influencing an adversary’s 
will and aimed at weakening the desire to continue fighting, and to 
reinforce resolve and protect one’s own forces from influence 
attempts. 
 Information operations affects an adversary’s capability to impose 
and apply a commander’s will through their command, control 
communications, computer and intelligence infrastructure so that 
the capability or capacity to impose and bolster will is degraded, 
destroyed, disrupted or denied. The operation also aims to protect 
and reinforce one’s own force capabilities so that the commander 
can impose and bolster his or her will without any disruption. 
3. Information Operations Versus Information Warfare 
The latest edition of the U.S. Joint Publication 3–13 “Information 
Operations” from 2006 removes “Information Warfare” as a term from the 
                                            
51 Försvarsmakten, Handbok Informationsoperationer (Stockholm: HKV, M7739–352014, 
2008), 23. 
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doctrine.52 It is still used, however, in publications and articles. So what is the 
difference and is it important to make the distinction between the two terms? It is 
almost impossible to give a clear uncontested and undisputed answer to the 
reason of why the term information warfare was abandoned. Some authors argue 
that information operations stretch over the entire conflict scale whereas 
information warfare has been a part of traditional warfare, which is the last stage 
of a political disagreement.53  Another explanation is that the term warfare is, by 
obvious reasons, closely connected to an act of violence, which is only one part 
of an information operation. Leigh Armistead argues that the change was forced 
because the term “warfare” itself could not be accepted by non-military U.S. 
federal agencies involved in this new aspect of conflict. Information operations 
are, according to Armistead, an acceptable compromise.54 
It could be argued that the military aspects are still warfare and that the 
overall definition to include non-military functions correctly used the term 
operations. Leigh Armistead makes the following distinction between the two 
terms: “Information warfare is what you use when information operations fail.”55 
The problem with compartmentalizing the different definitions is actions 
that include information operations carried out by military units in a non-violent 
conflict in the warfare definition. Alternatively, an information operation carried 
out by another agency clearly supporting one side is an information operation. In 
other words, there are non-violent aspects to military information operations, and 
violent aspects of non-military information related activities. 
                                            
52 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2006) iii. 
53 Edwin Leigh .Armistead, ed. Information Operations, Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft 
Power (Washington, D.C: Brassey’s Inc., 2004), 20. 
54 Edwin Leigh Armistead, Information Operations Matters: Best Practices (Dulles, VA: 
Potomac Books Inc., 2010), 94. 
55 Edwin Leigh Armistead, Information Operations, Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft 
Power (Washington, D.C: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), 19. 
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Another source of confusion is the different definitions used in various 
publications. The definitions even vary between editions of the same publication: 
Joint Publication 3–13 “Information Operations,” has changed the definition 
between the 1998 edition and the 2006 edition as follows: 
 
1998 IW 1998 IO 1998 IO 
ELEMENTS CAPABILITIES RELATED ACTIVITIES 
Computer Network Attack Computer Network Attack Public Affairs 
Deception Deception Civil Affairs 
Destruction Destruction  
Electronic Warfare Electronic Warfare  




2006 IO 2006 IO 2006 IO 
------ CORE CAPABILITIES SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES RELATED ACTIVITIES 
------ Computer Network Attack Information assurance Public Affairs 
------ Deception Physical security Civil Military Operations 
------ Electronic Warfare Physical attack Defense support to public  
------ Psychological Operations Counterintelligence Diplomacy 
------  Combat camera  
Table 2. JP 3–13 comparison IO definitions57 
As mentioned before, information warfare was removed from the entire 
2006 edition, and the definition of information operations does not include 
“destruction” as a core capability, but instead it is defined as a supporting 
capability. When comparing the two tables you can see that the elements 
included in the 1998 information warfare definition are the same as for the 2006 
information operations definition except for the term physical destruction. Does 
this mean that the difference is simply semantic? Are the terms “warfare” and 
                                            
56 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2006) GL-9. s.v. “Information Warfare”  
57 From: 2006 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information 
Operations (Washington, D.C., 2006) I-6. And:  
1998 Edition: United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 1998) I-9. 
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“operations” interchangeable in the U.S. doctrinal sphere? The 2006 edition 
describes information operations as follows: 
Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated 
employment of Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network 
Operations (CNO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military 
Deception (MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert 
with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, 
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 
decision-making while protecting our own.58 
The 1998 Edition describes it as: 
Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect 
adversary information and information systems while defending 
one’s own information and information systems. They apply across 
all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at 
every level of war. They are a critical factor in the Joint Force 
Commander’s (JFC’s) capability to achieve and sustain the level of 
information superiority required for decisive joint operations. 
The same edition defines information warfare as: 
Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to 
achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries.59 
The 2006 Edition does not make a distinction between “non-conflict” and 
“conflict.” Quite the contrary, it emphasizes that information operations are 
conducted across the entire range of a conflict and, therefore, information 
warfare as a terminology is obsolete.60 The changes between editions have 
created a situation where several authors discussing information operations or 
information warfare use either term, but seem to interpret the terms 
interchangeably. In addition, note that the general purpose and common 
                                            
58 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2006) ix. 
59 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 
(Washington, D.C., 1998) I-11. 
60 United States. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2006) I-8,  
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denominator for information operations is not changed between the editions: to 
influence will and capability in order to weaken an adversary and protecting and 
reinforce one’s own forces.61 
To conclude the discussion: the definition of information operations lacks a 
generally accepted taxonomy, which has made it difficult to understand and 
problematic to implement alongside other military capabilities.62 
4 Information Operations Versus I in DIME 
Before armies engage in physical violence, there are other means to 
resolve a conflict, such as diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions and the use of 
information in various ways. These three entities together with military operations 
represent the elements of power a nation or an international organization can use 
to influence an adversary, and is often referred to as DIME: the diplomatic, 
informational, military and economic instruments of power. The informational 
element of national power (I in DIME) can be described as the use of information 
content and technology to affect the behavior of governments, organizations and 
societies, with a long-term perspective. The informational instrument of power 
must be connected to the possibility of, and the will to escalate to, violence if 
necessary. Otherwise, there is a risk that the communicated message might be 
perceived as empty words without substance. The use of the informational 
element of power may begin long before any actual fighting begins, and 
furthermore the use of information might prevent physical violence. Information 
power is, in a DIME perspective, not exclusively or even primarily conducted by a 
nation’s military. That role falls to the “M” in DIME. Typically, many federal 
                                            
61 See the discussion in Chapter III:D:2. The Purpose of Information Operations. 
62 Edwin Leigh Armistead, Information Operations Matters: Best Practices, (Dulles, VA: 
Potomac Books Inc., 2010), 94. 
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agencies may engage in the use of informational power to protect national assets 
and to prevent conflict escalation.63  
Military led information operations, which are a subset of the “M” in DIME 
rather than of the “I,” are a component of all efforts a nation’s military can use to 
influence an adversary to change their behavior, but are not the only available 
information related resources or capabilities.  
5. Definition and Taxonomy of Information Operations  
Information operations affect all parts of a society and can be conducted 
through multiple actions, individually or in a concerted effort through operations 
or a campaign. Ultimately, information operations aims to influence will and 
capability so that an adversary’s power position is weakened while one’s own is 
reinforced. Similar to that of offense and defense in land warfare, protection from 
information operations is as essential as the ability to influence an adversary. 
The British Doctrine “Joint Warfare Publication 3–80, Information Operations” 
defines information operations as: 
Co-ordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or 
potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by 
undermining his will, cohesion and decision-making ability through 
affecting his information, information-based processes and systems 
while protecting one’s own decision-makers and decision-making 
processes.64 
This definition, in contrast to the U.S. JP 3–13 (2006 edition), emphasizes 
that information operations are a part of the political and military objectives for 
the conflict with the aim to impede the adversary’s ability to function and make 
correct decisions. The lack of informational core capabilities in the British 
definition is another significant difference between the two documents. It is also 
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64 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 3-80, 
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close to the definition the U.S. Secretary of Defense released in a January 25, 
2011 memorandum, which replaces the definition in the current U.S. information 
operations doctrine. The new definition is as follows: 
The integrated employment, during military operations, of 
information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of 
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-
making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting 
our own.65 
Even though this new U.S. definition is very close to the British definition 
in defining information operations, the comprehensive nature of the British 
definition, paired with precise formulated objectives, makes it attractive and easy 
to apply in discussions regarding information operations. Therefore, the British 
definition of information operations will be used.  
E. SUCCESS 
You ask, what is our aim? I can answer that, in one word: victory at 
all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard 
the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.  
—Sir Winston Churchill, House of Commons, May 1940. 
Ultimately, success in an armed conflict relies upon one side realizing the 
war cannot be won without intolerable sacrifices, and that the will to fight is so 
weakened that surrender, partial or complete, is a more desirable alternative than 
to continue the fighting. If this threshold is not met, a ceasefire due to a claimed 
victory is merely a chance for the defeated party to reorganize and later reinitiate 
resistance against the winner.66 
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As the term success is pivotal for the research question it must be 
thoroughly analyzed in order to establish a common understanding of the general 
meaning of what is success and, more specifically, how it is applied in an 
information operations perspective. To start from the very beginning, the 
semantic interpretation of the word success originally derives from the Latin word 
successus, which translates to an outcome. 
It is roughly the same answer if the word is looked up in a dictionary. Here 
the well-renowned Collins “English dictionary” is used: the dictionary defines 
success as67: 
1. The favorable outcome of something attempted. 
2. The attainment of wealth, fame, etc. 
3. An action, performance, etc., that is characterized by 
success. 
4. A person or thing that is successful. 
5. (Obsolete) any outcome. 
The first definition from Collins is closest to the research question: 
success is connected to an outcome of an action or process. The dictionary 
describes success in general terms, and it does not contain any thresholds or 
any other distinguishable indicators as to what outcomes are considered 
favorable or not. Furthermore, the description given in the dictionary is not 
specifically connected to military operations. To steer the search towards the 
military theory field, and thus find a more adequate and accurate definition, Carl 
von Clausewitz’s “On War” is used. This is probably the world’s most well 
renowned book on military theory and it is widely used as a reference. In the first  
 
 
                                            
67 Collins Cobuild, Advanced learners English Dictionary (Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers 
2003) s.v: “success.” 
 35
book (“On War” is divided into several books instead of chapters), “On the Nature 
of War” 68 Clausewitz states that: “War is thus an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will.”69 
Note that Clausewitz’s focus is at the strategic level and the term refers to 
the political will of a people. It should not be confused with the purpose of 
information operations as discussed earlier in the chapter. In the book, he argues 
that war is nothing but a large-scale duel and both sides strive to force the other 
to do their will. The quote reflects more the political reasons why a war is started, 
and it relates to the book’s discussion about the relationship between political will 
and physical violence. Clausewitz argues that war starts when political actions 
have no impact on the adversary and, therefore, is the last solution used to solve 
a political argument. Later in the book Clausewitz discusses the context of the 
act of war and he states that the military aim in war is: 
Fighting is the central military act...Engagements mean fighting. 
The object of fighting is the destruction or defeat of the enemy. 
What do we mean by the defeat of the enemy? Simply the 
destruction of his forces, whether by death, injury, or any other 
means—either completely or enough to make him stop 
fighting....The complete or partial destruction of the enemy must be 
regarded as the sole object of all engagements....Direct annihilation 
of the enemy’s forces must always be the dominant consideration.70 
The focus on the destruction of the enemy is related to the fact that an 
army can be reorganized and continues to fight if the will and the physical 
capability to do so still exists in a defeated army. Historically, the level of 
destruction was used as a measurement to define success. The only way to 
establish a solid win was to exterminate the enemy. Through the way in which 
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war has evolved, total destruction is almost impossible, but more importantly, it is 
considered inhumane in contemporary warfare because the fighting units are 
intertwined and inseparable from the rest of the society. In what can be 
considered as the quintessential example of total war, Germany was eventually 
forced to sign an unconditional surrender in World War II after both its military 
and civilian populace sustained years of attacks that it was no longer able to 
endure.  
Today, the stakes are higher if a people can accept the violent destruction 
of the enemy as suggested by Clausewitz, and traditional war has now been 
accompanied or replaced by asymmetrical operations, small wars and other 
operations that differ in context and execution from the type of traditional warfare 
that was prevalent when Clausewitz wrote his book. Therefore, it is necessary to 
introduce a more subtle definition of success than to destroy the enemy, in order 
to be able to determine whether operations were successful or not. 
The intention of the following discussion is to include various aspects of a 
conflict that influence outcome of a war in order to find a comprehensive 
definition of success in contemporary warfare. The discussion will also 
investigate how today’s conditions of conducting war is related to the classic 
principles of war, and if those principles still have relevance, particularly when 




Figure 4. President George W. Bush onboard USS Abraham Lincoln.71 
 Note the banner in the background. 
 
On March 20, 2003, the military invasion of Iraq began. On the 1st of May 
2003, former U.S. President George W. Bush was standing on the landing deck 
onboard the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN against a backdrop reading: “MISSION 
ACCOMPLISHED” and said: 
Admiral Kelly, Captain Card, officers and sailors of the USS 
Abraham Lincoln, my fellow Americans: Major combat operations in 
Iraq have ended. In the Battle of Iraq, the United States and our 
allies have prevailed. Now our coalition is engaged in securing and 
reconstructing that country.72 
The above quote shows how difficult it can be to determine success in a 
military operation. President George W. Bush did not state in his speech that the 
war was over, but that the “Major combat operations have ended.” During the first  
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two months of the war when the major combat operations were carried out, the 
U.S. forces had 138 casualties. From the end of the major combat operations in 
May 2003 until the end of 2009 an additional 4144 U.S. service members were 
killed.73 The hostile actions in Iraq continued and the American flag was not 
lowered until December 15, 2011, officially declaring the end of the Iraq War.74 
The quote also describes the need to understand the idea of success in conflicts 
and how success can be achieved when using force in a conflict. In this case, it 
can be argued that the military part of the Second Gulf War, or the Iraq War, was 
one of several efforts moving towards the end state of peace in Iraq, but 
importantly not the only effort. The end of military operations is not the end of the 
effort to establish a peaceful, democratic, and stable Iraq. Figure 4 also shows 
the importance of orchestrating all efforts towards the campaign end-state. A 
simple banner behind the president caused many of the target audience to 
believe that the war was over and the forces could return safely. History turned 
out differently. 
There is no second place in war, no silver medal for good efforts. 
Therefore, both sides will evaluate their chance to succeed before resorting to 
physical violence. An important ingredient in this evaluation is the will to fight, 
and the people’s will to make deadly sacrifices. Clausewitz argues this in his 
famous discussion concerning the “trinity,” which is an interactive set of three 
forces that drive the events of war that consists of: 
primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded 
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which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of 
subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to 
reason alone.75 
The natural force involved in war belongs to the people of a country. This 
blind natural force of violence that blazes up in war must be inherent in the 
people before the violence begins.76 According to Clausewitz, the will to fight 
must emanate from the people, concentrated in a political will to endanger your 
country’s freedom and independence in order to gain political success. The will to 
fight must be related to the probability of success. Otherwise, there will be a 
likelihood that the people’s will diminishes and one side surrenders, even before 
the hostilities begin. Throughout history, there are few examples of states 
surrendering without a fight. More common has been fierce fighting even though 
one side is clearly inferior to the other. Obviously, the question arises: why do the 
people believe in success even if all indications and calculated probabilities 
forecast defeat? Dominic Johnson discusses this issue in his book, 
“Overconfidence and War,”77 that there is a general overconfidence in the 
assumption of one’s own ability to put up resistance or to conduct an attack on 
the enemy. This overconfidence explains better why war is waged even though 
all rational arguments speak against it. It also introduces relativity for the term 
success. Victory in itself is taken to confirm that the victor was the stronger party, 
even though the actual reason might have been a smart concentration of 
available units, smart use of the terrain or just luck.78 
The outcome of war is dependent upon many factors, such as operational 
and tactical superiority, available reserves, better logistics, and higher morale. All 
                                            
75 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. 
76 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. 
77 Dominic Johnson, Overconfidence and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 3. 
78 Stuart Albert and Edward C. Luck, On the Endings of Wars (Port Washington, N.Y: 
Kennikat Press Corporation, 1980), 53. 
 40
of these can be considered measurements of strength. Victory, however, can 
also be dependent upon superior production capability79 or the availability of 
natural resources, such as crude oil. Clausewitz mentions the increasing 
importance of production capacity in his discussion concerning strategy: “In 
tactics as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element in 
victory.”80 
Even if Clausewitz’s empiricism is based on observations from conflicts in 
the early 19th Century (pre-industrialization age), his discussion regarding 
numbers is still valid, especially in traditional warfare. The industrialization of 
Western Europe and North America is considered to be a starting point of a new 
generation of warfare, the industrialized war. This type of war is dependent on 
production capability to a much higher degree than before. Does this conclude 
that success in modern warfare solely can be explained by resource differences 
between countries? Not really. If the adversary uses forces economically and 
only engages in combat under favorable situations, a smaller force can still beat 
a larger. The use of your forces has a direct impact on your probability for 
success, and as Wayne P. Hughes states: “Warfare is deadly conflict. Tactics, 
being the devices of battle, are conceived and executed at the physical and 
metaphorical center of this violence.”81 
When defining success, it is important to understand the fundamentals of 
warfare. War is a sequence of battles and there is no automatic correlation 
between successes at the tactical level with the general outcome of the war. Of 
course, if one side wins all the battles and succeeds in destroying the opposing 
forces, then that side is considered to be the stronger party and will likely win the 
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war. The connection between the levels of war can be achieved through a 
comprehensive campaign plan that relates success at each level to a strategic 
objective. When examining history, mere success in battle is not equivalent to 
final success in war. Destruction of the opposing forces is just as important, if not 
more so. The German Wehrmacht initially achieved substantial territorial gains, 
but at the end could not withstand the Allied Forces and lost WWII. It is claimed 
that the United States did not lose a major battle in Vietnam. Still the outcome of 
the war is unanimously regarded as a victory for North Vietnam and a defeat for 
the United States and its South Vietnamese ally, resulting in unification under the 
control of the North.82 
This demonstrates that success must be related to what is measured. This 
seems obvious, but as mentioned earlier, success in a single battle does not 
mean success in war. In the military context it is important to establish objectives 
in order to determine success at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The 
objectives must be connected to each other through a top-down process, through 
campaign planning in order to create a coherent chain of objectives. In the 
Vietnam War example, the U.S. forces achieved an outstanding success at the 
tactical level, but the war was still lost at the strategic level. 
So far, the discussion has shown that success in warfare is not an 
absolute term. Rather, it is in “the eye of the beholder” and it is dependent on the 
level of warfare being examined. All the difficulties aside, few wars have ended in 
a tie with regard to the military outcome. A clarifying example is to return to the 





                                            




the Coalition at the lower levels of war, as the Iraqi military forces almost ceased 
to exist; however, the strategic objectives were not met, or even properly 
defined.83 
With that in mind, it was an overly bold statement to declare, “MISSION 
ACCOMPLISHED” on the flyer above President Bush during his speech. It can 
even be argued, based on the number of casualties since, that the statement that 
“major combat operations have ended” was too optimistic. The mission for the 
war, to which overall success should be measured against, was not well thought 
out. 
Almost all literature covering general military theory presents a list called 
the “principles of war.” The list consists of approximately ten historically based 
principles that the commander and his staff need to take into consideration when 
planning for and executing war. The first principle is “Objective” or “The Selection 
and Maintenance of the Aim.” The necessity to define objectives for your 
operation is so fundamental in armed conflict that this is regarded as the “Master 
Principle” and is always the first on the list of the principles of war, regardless of 
which list you reference.84  
Therefore, the first and most important step when planning an operation is 
to select and clearly define the aim.85 The overall aim provides guidance when 
planning operations on the operational and tactical level. Inside the overall aim, 
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each operation must be directed towards this goal. The planners must analyze, 
interpret, and define the limited objectives for each individual operation.86 From 
the operational to the tactical level, objectives are turned into tasks for the 
component commanders. The levels of war and each level’s relationship 
between end state, objectives, effects, mission and tasks are presented in 
Figure 5: 
 
Level Guidance   
National Strategic Strategic end state 
Objectives 
 End state describes the 
set of conditions to meet 
conflict termination criteria 




 Objectives prescribe 
friendly goals  
Effects describe the 
conditions related to the 
objectives 




 Tasks describe friendly 
actions to create desired 





 Mission describes the 
organization’s essential task 
or task(s) and purpose 
 
Figure 5 Levels of war related to end state objectives and tasks.87 
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According to the U.S. Joint Publication 1–02 “Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” the term objective is defined as:  
1. The clearly defined, decisive and attainable goal toward 
 which every operation is directed.  
2. The specific target of the action taken which is essential to 
 the commander’s plan.88 
Objectives provide commanders and staff with references to measure the 
outcome of an operation by comparing the actual situation and the desired 
situation as described by the objectives established for the operation. 
Success can be described as the favorable outcome of something 
attempted. An objective is a description of a desired situation after the action has 
taken place. If these two terms are combined together, they create a definition of 
success that is general, but still precise enough to be applied in a military 
context: 
Success is the measured level of fulfillment of pre-determined 
objectives on all levels of war, either isolated or orchestrated in combined 
efforts. 
This assumes, critically, that the mission analysis is properly conducted 
and that the objectives are properly defined. Success in this definition is simply a 
measurement and it is completely dependent on the planner’s ability to clearly 
and timely define decisive and attainable goals. Furthermore, the definition is not 
related to any physical thresholds, such as destruction of the enemy or seizure of 
the nation. Each operation will define appropriate thresholds, and eventually the 
outcome will determine the level of success. It also addresses the relationship 
between a single objective and a desired campaign end-state.   
Finally, the relationship between success and victory should be noted. The 
term victory is frequently used in military literature. Victory usually refers to a final 
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success. Its nature is binary. Either you achieve victory or you fail. Seldom is the 
term used to describe a limited victory or “small victory.” 89 As with many other 
frequently used terms, the definition varies with the author. In the present thesis 
research, victory will be viewed as equal to success. 
F. CONCLUDING REMARKS OF THE CHAPTER 
The aim for this chapter has been to create a foundation for the following 
discussion and conclusions. As shown, information and its use in military 
operations is a complex topic and a rather young discipline, still undergoing 
significant development. For any further work based on this thesis, the 
development of the definition for information operations must be analyzed in 
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IV. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
This chapter will discuss and present answers to the research questions. 
Initially success in information operations is discussed: what it is and how it is 
determined. In order to better understand how success is determined the answer 
is divided into two sub-answers: determination of success in the past tense and 
future tense. Then the text discusses the challenges of evaluating an effects 
based approach as proposed in the referenced doctrines. Thereafter, the chapter 
describes what success is and how it is determined in the maritime domain. 
Finally, the chapter applies the terminology and methodology from the maritime 
domain onto the information environment and discusses the benefits of using that 
domain’s established concept of success. 
A. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Ultimately, information operations are construed of battles over the 
decision makers’ minds. Using a number of different capabilities and methods, 
information operations seeks to influence an adversary’s will and thus negatively 
affect decision-making capabilities while at the same time protecting one’s own 
commander from being adversely influenced. Physical destruction of targets 
linked to information operations objectives is dual-nature in this sense. For 
example, a destroyed radio station both represents traditional destruction, similar 
to other kinetic targets, but it also affects the adversary’s capability to exercise 
command and it can, if correctly applied, be a strong message to the adversary’s 
armed forces and population.90 The other capabilities used in information 
operations are mainly non-kinetic and use the physical and informational 
dimensions to affect the adversary’s cognitive dimension, with the aim of slowing 
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down decision-making processes or reshaping the physical battle space, either in 
real terms or in the enemy’s mind, creating real effects.91 
The challenge when defining success in information operations is to know 
if the operation has affected adversary behavior completely, a little, or not at all. 
This is especially valid if information operations is used in a conflict, where there 
is little or no possibility to interact with the target or the population of the target, 
i.e., traditional warfare where the opposing forces are fighting each other on 
defined fronts. Identifying and understanding relevant indicators to measure an 
adversary’s change of behavior is difficult to say the least. It is easier to evaluate 
information operations in UN Chapter V (peacekeeping) or VII (peace 
enforcement) operations,92 where a neutral force stands in between the opposing 
parties and has the ability to interact with both parties as well as the civilian 
population. 
1. What is Success in Information Operations? 
“For I am Vader! Darth Vader! Lord Vader! I can kill you with a 
single thought!” 
—British Comedian Eddie Izzard, 
impersonation of Darth Vader93 
Hopefully, we will never come to a situation where we are able to kill each 
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revolution in military affairs to not only support warfare, but to emerge as a 
weapon itself.94 This development has called for a theoretical discussion 
concerning information warfare. 
As information warfare emerged as a stand-alone discipline in the military, 
a theoretical discussion evolved within the information community trying to 
establish a definition of absolute information dominance. This was an attempt to 
find a general definition similar to Clausewitz’s statement regarding the ultimate 
success in war: “The complete or partial destruction of the enemy must be 
regarded as the sole object of all engagements.”95 
As an outcome of this discussion, the expression Information Superiority 
was introduced to explain and envision the state of absolute control over one’s 
own information flow and, at the same time, achieving full control over the 
opposing forces ability to use the information environment. The importance of 
superiority is more pronounced in visionary documents than in doctrinal 
documents. It is also more pronounced in U.S. documents than in British 
documents or in other countries with more limited military resources. The reason 
for the U.S. focus on achieving information superiority might be explained by the 
fact that the United States has the resources to establish conventional military 
superiority and easily envisions the possibility of establishing superiority in the 
information environment, despite the difficulty that is acknowledged for doing so. 
The United States follows a desire to explore this possibility. The two terms can, 
similarly to Clausewitz’s definition of the ultimate aim for warfare, be a good 
starting point for establishing a definition of what is success in information 
operations. Information superiority is defined in “Joint Vision 2010” as: “The 
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”96 
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The ultimate aim for information superiority should, in accordance with the 
aforementioned definition, be to establish an information environment where one 
side has unlimited control of the flow of information, including the capability to 
control the adversary’s use of it. Absolute success would then be accomplished 
when a state of information superiority was established. However, also similar to 
traditional warfare, success in information operations has moved towards a more 
graded scale. The British doctrine “Joint Warfare Publication 3–80, Information 
Operations” states: “by undermining his will, cohesion and decision-making ability 
through affecting his information, information-based processes and systems” to 
describe the desired effects information operations should achieve.  
This calls for a need to grade success with more than a binary definition; 
something more than absolute control or no control is required. In order to create 
a general definition of success with the ability to grade the level of 
accomplishment, the general definition of success from the previous discussion 
has been slightly adjusted, although its core definition is still valid: 
Success in information operations is a favorable level of fulfillment 
of related objectives on all levels of war, either isolated or orchestrated in 
combined efforts. 
There are other perspectives of success in information operations, as 
Robert Leonhard argues in his book, “The Principles of War for the Information 
Age” about the reasons why to conduct information operations: “It is about 
making the friendly force move faster, shoot better and protect itself more 
economically. It is about slowing the enemy, disrupting his operations 
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Planning” that the ultimate objective for information operations is to change the 
behavior of the enemy commander because of the conducted information 
operations.98 
It can be argued that the different definitions are purely semantic, but they 
show that there is no widely accepted overall success definition within the 
information operations community. Success in information is, therefore defined 
as stated above. 
2. How is Success Determined in Information Operations? 
It might be seen as a contradiction, but success can, and in military 
planning must, be discussed from both a predictive and an evaluative 
perspective. The reasons for the need to differentiate between the perspectives 
can be found in the military planning process. In warfare, the need to predict the 
future is more important than evaluating the past. One of the first steps in 
operational planning is to establish a desired end-state and the purpose of the 
operation, i.e., a wished-for favorable change in the area of operations and/or the 
behavior of the adversary from the current situation. A clear end-state is also 
critical when choosing a line of operations, and later on when assigning troops to 
carry out tasks. If this is not done properly the possibility of victory is considerably 
diminished. 99 
It is easier to measure from the evaluative perspective, as the 
measurements are conducted after the event has occurred, and the answers are 
available to be collected with appropriate evaluation tools. This is why it is so 
prevalent to examine the past, to “fight the last war.” The predictive perspective 
cannot be easily measured. Instead, it requires estimates of the adversary’s 
reactions and how the intended actions affect the area of operations. Information 
operations aggravates the circumstances by including mainly non-kinetic and 
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often non-visible effects. Often there are no bomb craters or destroyed weapons 
platforms to reveal the outcome of the efforts. Trying to predict the outcome is 
surrounded by a degree of uncertainty. 
Determining success in information operations should also be discussed 
by using internal versus external objectives. An internal or cognitive objective is 
aiming at the will, either influencing an adversary or protecting one’s own forces 
from any attempt to be influenced. This type of objective relates to a change in 
the cognitive dimension of the target audience. An internal objective must be 
determined for each operation as it places emphasis on the cognitive perceptual 
differences between prior and post-operation situations in a defined area of 
operation.100 An external objective is defined by a desired change of the 
environment or the capabilities for decision-making. It does not emphasize the 
current situation as much as it focuses on the desired situation after the 
operation.  
Another factor to consider is the time and space alignment with the 
traditional warfighting domains. In a perfect world, there are no time constraints 
and each information operation can be continued until the desired effect is 
achieved and evaluated before the next phase is initiated. In modern warfare, 
however, different actions must be synchronized. This is done by constructing 
distinctive phases separated in time and space, often through a campaign.101 
An operation usually moves to the next phase when it is assessed that the 
objectives for the current phase have been achieved.102 In joint operations, 
information operations typically have a supporting function to the overall 
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operation, although they occasionally may form the main effort.103 The pace with 
which the operation is moving forward is decided by the main effort for the 
operation. An information operation must be able to keep up with the overall 
battle tempo. 
The two time tenses presented above will be discussed more thoroughly 
to be able more accurately answer the thesis research question. 
3. An Evaluative Approach to Determine Success 
The U.S., British and Swedish information operations doctrines all discuss 
evaluation as the method to determine the outcome of an information operation. 
In these doctrines, the determination of success is conducted by analyzing the 
relationship between action and reaction. Furthermore, all three doctrines focus 
on internal, cognitive objectives. The doctrines suggest that post-action 
evaluation is divided into two sub parts: measuring action and reaction. 
 Evaluating action is about measuring how well a specific task is 
carried out. This is also referred to as a measurement of 
performance (MOP). 
 Evaluating reaction is about measuring how the specific task 
changed the target’s behavior or will to fight. This is also referred to 
as measurement of effectiveness (MOE).104 
 Physical destruction and other lethal reactions to an information 
operation are subject to the same evaluation as all other warfare: 
did the action physically affect the target or not? If not, repeat the 
action. 
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Hence, MOEs are not equal to objectives. They are a measure of the 
effect the action had on the adversary force, the environment or the population. 
MOE must be defined for each operation and they must be related to the 
objectives for the operation in order to facilitate an evaluation of real-life results in 
comparison to the desired effects. They must be measurable either qualitatively 
or quantitatively. The desired effects must be realistic. Furthermore, it is essential 
that a recognized situational picture of the area of operation be established prior 
to the operation if MOE shall be used. Otherwise, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure the difference before and after an operation.105 
Examples of the relationships between information operations capabilities, 
MOPs and MOEs are presented in Table 3, which is taken from the U.S. Joint 
Publication 3–13, “Information Operations.” Note the examples of MOEs in the 
third column. All of them are measurable in the physical domain except the last 
row, MOE for CNO. The proposed MOE is not measurable without having access 
to the adversary’s own evaluation. This highlights one of the problems with 
measuring effectiveness in information operations: the ability to measure the 
correlation between effort and outcome or action and reaction. 
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4. Challenges with Measuring Success in Information Operations  
There are several challenges involved in the evaluation process when 
using measures of performance and measure of effectiveness: 
 The first challenge is to translate operational objectives into MOE’s. 
This is especially evident if the objectives are internal, i.e., cognitive 
objectives aimed at affecting the adversary’s will.  
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 A feedback process for the operation is necessary so that the 
operation can be evaluated. This process should have the 
capability to provide sequential feedback.  
 Observable external indicators must be identified revealing 
changes in the cognitive dimension of the targeted audience. 
 An appropriate measuring method must be selected and applied so 
that the output actually relates to the actions. Again, note how the 
MOEs are constructed to meet this requirement except for the CNO 
MOE. 
 Even if there are adequate MOEs established, it can be difficult to 
correlate reactions to a specific desired effect. 
 Non-expected reactions or events among the target audience may 
lead to wrong conclusions and create false positives. 
 There is a tendency to overestimate abilities and, consequently, 
overestimate the importance of actions and the impact they have 
on the achievement of objectives.107 
 Finally, the output of the evaluation must be in a format that allows 
for correlation with the objectives for the information operation. 
The bullets above do not represent a fully comprehensive list of all 
possible challenges in evaluating an information operation, but they show that 
information operations are difficult to evaluate. This is especially so if there is a 
need to evaluate events just as they occur or sequentially so that the next set of 
actions can be adjusted based on how the operation is proceeding.108 
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5. A Predictive Approach to Determine Success 
The generic idea of predicting success begins with establishing objectives 
for the operation, with the possibility for success being related to the probability 
of achieving the stated objectives.109 To induce a better understanding of the 
challenges that come with any attempt to predict achievement of objectives, one 
must recall the definition of information operations: 
Co-ordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or 
potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by 
undermining his will, cohesion and decision-making ability through 
affecting his information, information based processes and systems 
while protecting one’s own decision-makers and decision-making 
processes.110 
The focus on influencing an adversary’s will and decision-making abilities 
makes it rather difficult to forecast and accurately verbalize reactions of the 
planned actions in order to meet objectives for the operation. Furthermore, the 
objectives must include effects in the physical dimension resulting from attempts 
to influence the cognitive dimension, in order to address the will and decision-
making of the adversary. The challenges are enhanced by the fact that 
information operations are complex by nature, and together with the use of 
cognitive objectives the process to predict success is difficult, to say the least.111 
One of the main reasons for having a method to predict success is the 
commander’s guidance, which initiates the operational planning process. This 
guidance must clearly identify in what way information operations should 
contribute in order to achieve the overall objectives.112 Prior to issuing the 
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guidance, the commander must have a good sense of what is needed and what 
is attainable in order to ensure a successful operation. 
The doctrines examined do not provide guidelines on how to identify and 
formulate guidance that is recognizable and easy to comprehend by all staff 
personnel. If possible, this process should also be recyclable, which further 
enhances the recognition factor. Instead, the outlined procedures require a 
unique set of directions for each operation.113 The traditional domains’ doctrines 
have more explicitly pronounced principles concerning the purpose in deploying 
military forces in an area of operations. The maritime domain, for instance, 
requires naval presence if a nation wants to control its own territorial waters, and 
even more importantly, the ability to secure the flow of exported and imported 
goods over the sea. The governing principle or general concept of operation in 
this case is called “control at sea.”114 
The governing principles correlate to external objectives, i.e., a desired 
end state of what the maritime area of operation should look like after the actions 
have been carried out. Everybody who has ever been involved in planning for a 
maritime operation is familiar with the general concept of maritime operations. 
This recognition factor creates a situation where the staff immediately acquires a 
high level of understanding when operations are being planned. It also enables 
the use of a standardized and recyclable processes for the staff. 
In order to visualize the difference in approaches, here is a metaphor. 
Imagine reading restaurant reviews and this is the initiating direction for the 
decision on where to go out and eat tonight. Taste is a relative and cognitive 
experience based on previous experiences and preferences. If the reviewer 
would write the review only to satisfy a certain cognitive dimension, he/she could 
go on about the texture of the mousse d’écrevisse or the extraordinary cooked 
                                            
113 Sweden Försvarsmakten, Handbok Informationsoperationer (Stockholm, HKV, M7739–
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114 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10, British Maritime 
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emulsion of egg yolk and butter, seasoned with lemon juice, salt and a little white 
pepper. An expert could easily understand that this restaurant is specialized in 
seafood and specifically French fine dining.115 For most readers, however, this 
would make no sense. Instead, most reviewers follow a set pattern. First, they 
provide the basic information about the setting, impression of the atmosphere, 
the service and, of course, what kind of food served at the restaurant (Italian, 
seafood or maybe steaks). Then the reviewer will mention the specific food 
consumed and the general impression of the quality and taste of the food served. 
The readers, especially if they have read multiple reviews from the same 
reviewer, will recognize the structure of the review, core words and would be able 
to relate the review with their own preferences. The purpose for the review will be 
satisfied by both examples. Both will appeal to their cognitive dimension of 
satisfying their hunger. Both are written in non-quantitative terms. However, one 
will appeal to a larger audience, the other to a very small group of professionals.  
The metaphor is used to show that if a recognized and recycled concept of 
operations is used in the planning process it is easier to reach broader 
understanding and acceptance for the operation. 
6. Findings  
The problem with determining success in information operations is the 
complexity of the information environment. The analyzed doctrines all focus on 
post-action evaluation in order to measure success. They also require the use of 
effects to determine success. The challenges of transforming activities and 
objectives into related effects were highlighted in the chapter and further add 
complexity to the subject. None of the doctrines gives any clear answer on how 
to receive timely evaluation on how the operation is proceeding in order for 
appropriate adjustments to be applied to the ongoing operation. The lack of 
recognized general concepts of operations can hamper the ability to issue 
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effective directives, and as a result make it more difficult to predict the outcome 
of an information operation and optimize the power of information. 
B. APPLYING MARITIME TERMINOLOGY AND PRINCIPLES TO 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
When a thing has been said and said well, have no scruple. Take it 
and copy it.  
—Anatole France, French writer, member of the French  
Academy and Nobel Prize winner in literature in 1921. 
The information environment and the maritime domain share many 
characteristics. Neither of them can be contained or seized, but both need to be 
mastered in warfare. There is no possible way to establish a permanent 
occupation. As soon as a force leaves the area of operation, it is free again. The 
similarities are somewhat apparent when studying information operations 
literature. There are discussions regarding information superiority, an offspring 
from the older established maritime term “sea superiority.” The literature, 
however, does not make a complete leap towards copying the entire set of 
principles already established in naval doctrine and naval theoretical literature. 
What is important to understand in both cases is the reason for fighting 
over “empty space.” In the maritime domain, this is concerned with sea lines of 
communications. In the information environment, it is all about information flow 
and content. Both concern the right for each nation to establish and manage 
communications without interference from an adversary. The maritime domain 
uses the lines of communication for transports of goods and passengers while 
the other information environment uses them to send and receive information.  
Because the two fight a similar battle and struggle with battlefields that are 
hard-to-hold and define, the similarities seem significant enough for a 
comparison to be constructive and enlightening. Therefore, in order to pursue 
further the search for how success can be determined, an analysis of how 
success is defined in the maritime domain will be performed, and then this 
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analysis will be applied to the information environment. Finally, findings will be 
discussed followed by a general conclusion. 
1. The Maritime Domain and Overall Objectives for Naval Forces 
The sea covers approximately 70 percent of the Earth’s surface and the 
vast majority of the sea is so called “high seas which consist of all the sea that is 
geographically outside any legal jurisdiction from a single state.” Therefore, their 
judicial status is regulated in various conventions.116 
The zones between the shoreline and high seas are called national 
maritime zones. This is where the coastal states have extended their jurisdiction. 
Foreign warships and submarines still have unrestricted access to the outer parts 
of this zone for exercises and routine operations.117 
No matter the judicial status, the sea cannot be permanently occupied by 
humans, and borders are not visible other than as lines on a sea chart. There are 
no road signs telling you that you are leaving U.S. sea territory. The sea cannot 
be inhabited or fortified. Therefore, a maritime operation will not change the 
geography or leave any permanent signs that a certain part of the sea belongs to 
a specific state. Furthermore, it is not possible to build fences around a state’s 
sea territory and prohibit trespassing. On the contrary, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea states that: “Subject to this Convention, ships 
of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea.”118 
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The geographic differences between land and sea warfare renders that 
the purpose and aim of sea warfare is different from land warfare.119 The ultimate 
purpose with traditional land warfare is always connected to territorial claims. 
Despite its lethality, sea warfare can, at the most, contribute with decisive 
supporting actions for land warfare. 120 
So, why spend tremendous amounts of resources to build and maintain a 
navy if they have merely a supporting role in warfare? The answer is the sea’s 
enormous importance for transportation. As an example, approximately 
95 percent of U.S. foreign trade passes through U.S. ports, and the volume of 
commerce using sea transport is foreseen to increase significantly in the 
future.121 
The domination of sea transportation has been constant throughout 
history. All states with a merchant fleet have felt it necessary to build and operate 
a navy to protect their commercial trade routes.122 The importance of the sea 
trade routes has been recognized and discussed since sea warfare began to be 
studied in a scientific context. One of the first to study naval warfare was Julian 
Corbett, a British naval historian and geo-strategist, who concluded that naval 
warfare is all about controlling the sea lines of communications: 
The object of naval warfare is control of communications, and not, 
as in land warfare, the conquest of territory. The difference is 
fundamental. True, it is rightly said that strategy ashore is mainly a 
question of communications, but they are communications in  
 
 
                                            
119David Jablonsky, ed. Roots of strategy (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 
231. 
120 Christopher Werner, Den blå boken, Marina stridskrafter ur ett militärteoretiskt perspektiv, 
(Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2002), 43. 
121 NOAA, “Revitalizing Ports to Benefit Economic Activity and Healthy 
Ecosystems,”“ Revised October 5, 2007, 
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/portfields.htm,  
122 Marco Smedberg, Om sjökriget, Från Svensksund till Smygteknik (Stockholm: Page One 
publishing,1996), 11–13. 
 63
another sense. The phrase refers to communications of the army 
alone, and not to the wider communications which are part of the 
life of the nation.123 
The term sea control (early naval theorists used the term command of the 
sea, but the development of naval theory changed the term to control instead of 
command) is commonly used as the highest objective for naval warfare. The 
Swedish naval officer and theorist Christopher Werner divides this overall 
objective into three sub-objectives:  
 Establish sea control 
 Exercise sea control 
 Dispute sea control124 
Sea control is a means to an end to secure sea lines of communications. 
Geoffrey Till concurs with this conclusion in his book, Sea Power, A Guide for the 
Twenty-First Century, where he argues that exploitation of sea control is the 
ultimate goal.125 The author Raul Castex argues that sea control consists of “the 
control of essential maritime communications.”126 
A state’s ability to establish and maintain sea control, denying it to an 
opposing navy, is the overall objective for a state’s navy. Sea control exists when 
there is freedom of action to use an area of the sea for one’s own purposes, and 
if necessary deny its use to an opponent. Logically, if you have sea control your 
opponent will not be able to interfere with your naval activities in that area. If an 
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opponent successfully contests your sea control, you can no longer claim sea 
control and your operations will be focused on regaining sea control or continuing 
to contest it. 
 
 
Figure 6. Concept of naval operations 
 
2. What is Sea Control? 
Julian Corbett’s classic definition of sea control was published 1911127 and 
has since then maintained a worldwide central position in naval theory. However, 
several theorists have published their own versions. The main difference 
between the definitions addresses the degree of control required to claim sea 
control. The most extreme is the necessity to achieve absolute control in the 
entire area of operations. As an example, the U.S. “Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 
Naval Warfare” does not address control at sea specifically. Instead, the 
publication uses “Battle Space Dominance” to describe a situation where the 
United States has full superiority in a defined zone or area of operation.128 
Achieving battle space dominance is both desirable and realistic for a 
superpower such as the United States. 
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Battle space dominance, however, is almost a utopia for countries with 
limited resources and limited naval warfare ambitions. Instead, establishing sea 
control should be amended with specified limitations in order to make the task 
realistic and achievable. The naval theorist Geoffrey Till mentions five factors that 
should be taken into consideration when discussing sea control:129 
 Time. Based on historic evidence, sea control is not constant over 
time. No country has so far dominated the maritime operating area 
to the extent that a permanent sea control has been achieved and 
maintained over an extended period. 
 Place. The sea control can extend over the entire area of operation 
or just a part of the area. 
 Extent of use. Sea control can only be achieved to a degree. The 
opposing navy can usually pose some threat to your sea control. 
 Strategic consequence. The importance of achieving and 
maintaining sea control in a specific area is dependent upon the 
opponent’s strength in the adjacent land and air theater of war. Sea 
control can be negated if the opposing force is superior in strength 
in the other domains. 
 Necessity. There is a need to establish a local sea control to a 
predetermined degree in order to conduct naval operations, but the 
need for an absolute sea control is questionable. 
These five bullets summarize a common ground about modern sea control 
among contemporary naval theorists. Sea control is a relative term with several 
parameters to take into consideration when planning or conducting naval 
operations. 
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This discussion has posited that the ultimate goal for traditional naval 
operations is to establish sea control in order to secure sea lines of 
communications for one’s own need and purposes. If a navy does not have the 
capability and resources to establish sea control, it can still significantly disturb 
and cause severe economic and other challenges to an opponent by contesting 
sea control. As an example, when one large car carrier ship is sunk, 8000 cars 
are also sunk, which will have multiple and significant effects. There are 
economic aspects on losing a whole cargo ship; but even worse, this creates a 
feeling of uncertainty and insecurity for civilians who most probably will call for 
actions in order to re-establish sea control.130 
3. Establish Sea Control 
Sea control can essentially be achieved in two ways: destruction of the 
enemy through decisive battle or containment of the opponent’s navy through 
blockade.131 
It is worth mentioning that Geoffrey Till has included “fleet-in-being” as a 
way to achieve sea control.132 Apart from that, the first two methods are 
considered the two primary ways to achieve sea control among naval 
theorists.133 
a. Decisive Battle 
The decisive battle is potentially the quickest, though the most 
risky, way to establish sea control. The objective for the battle is annihilation of 
the enemy’s naval force. Raul Castex describes the objective for naval warfare 
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as follows: “Thus, we will attempt before everything, in one way or another, to put 
the principal enemy fleet out of action. The best method is obviously to destroy it 
in battle.”134 
The trend is that decisive battle is becoming rarer. Instead, it has 
been replaced by a series of battles where the ultimate aim is still to annihilate 
the enemy’s naval force, but doing that systematically.135 
b. Blockade 
Another way to establish sea control is by blockade. This can be 
distant or close. The method of seizing choke points is argued by contemporary 
naval theory as a form of blockade, which means that you control a passage or 
strait, which the opponent has to pass in order to reach the area of operation. 
Blockade has been successful in the past, but modern long 
distance weapons have reduced the necessity to be physically present in the 
area of operations. Furthermore, a blockade requires a huge superiority in sheer 
number of ships to be successful.136 
4. Disputing Sea Control 
The ultimate objective for both parties in a naval conflict is to establish sea 
control. Logically, one force will have to dispute the control at sea if they are not 
able to establish it.137 Disputing sea control is simply the opposite of establishing 
control. The disputing force must try to avoid battles except where they have 
local superiority and avoid any attempt to establish a blockade. Every opportunity 
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to contest and threaten sea control must be exploited.138 The methods to dispute 
sea control are comprised of fleet in being and minor counter attacks.139 
A classic example of fleet-in-being is the German battleship Tirpitz who 
served her entire career as a “fleet in being.” Even though she never fired a shot 
at an enemy ship, her mere presence forced the Allied navies to allocate many 
warships to defend Arctic convoys. The influence of an established fleet-in-being 
was summarized by Sir Winston Churchill in a memorandum to the British Chief 
of Staff Committee in 1942: “The destruction, or even the crippling, of this ship is 
the greatest event at sea at the present time. No other target is comparable to it. 
The entire naval situation throughout the world would be altered.”140  
How does a navy know when its operational possibilities are reduced to 
only disputing control instead of challenging the enemy to establish sea control? 
Naval theorists give no general answer to that question, but they all discuss the 
relationship between two opposing forces in a naval operation in terms of 
“stronger-weaker” or “superior-inferior in strength.” 
There are no general rules to be applied in order to determine whether 
one is superior or inferior in strength or whether one is stronger. The answer is 
embedded in the specific situation. A staff can apply quantitative as well as 
qualitative tools to determine strength. Ultimately, it is a decision for the 
commander. 
5. Conclusions about Success in Maritime Operations 
The possibility of establishing sea control relies on several factors. The 
most common requirement is superiority in the number of naval ships. The 
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quantitative strength states that more ships wins over fewer. The modern naval 
theorist Milan Vego argues that: “the size of a fleet and its force-mix in peacetime 
are a good indicator as to what probable strategic objectives in a given narrow 
sea will be pursued in wartime.”141 
In reality, the United States is the only maritime superpower in the modern 
world. All other nations must rely upon a local concentration of naval resources 
or the possibility of concentrating their naval weapons in a certain area of 
operations, and by that create a local superiority of quantitative strength. Sheer 
numbers is in itself not enough to explain victory in naval warfare. The ability to 
optimize the use of available resources is crucial to success. 
In order to establish sea control, a naval force must both be large enough 
to be considered a serious threat, and at same time the available resources must 
be used in the most efficient way possible. The skill of the navy commander is 
essential even if his or her force outnumbers the enemy. 
Establishing or disputing sea control can be viewed as two sides of the 
same coin, not as two separate and distinguishable entities. If one side is 
superior in numbers (of comparable quality in platforms and weaponry), the other 
must logically be inferior and settle for disputing sea control. The commander’s 
skill is as equally important in disputing as it is in establishing sea control. The 
ability to maneuver the fleet to the most favorable situation and to know one’s 
ship and make the best use of available technology are crucial for success and 
survival when disputing sea control. 
Naval warfare consists of two major components: tactics and technology. 
The two terms are intertwined and dependent upon each other. Just imagine a 
naval battle without ships or ships without a crew. This fact distinguishes naval  
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operations from ground combat. Hughes states in his book Fleet Tactics: “But 
what is true in ground combat, where machines serve men, is magnified at sea, 
where men serve machines.”142 
Success in naval operations is a question not only of numbers and 
technology, but also the skillset of the crew and the commander and that the ship 
with crew is appropriately constructed and trained for the specific operation. 
These requirements are independent of whether one force is superior or the 
inferior or what kind of operation a naval force is planning to conduct or carrying 
out. 
The decisive point when success is achieved is a relative term and can 
seldom be pinpointed with absolute accuracy. Eventually, one side will declare 
success, and it might be at a point when the other side changes its objectives so 
that operations can terminate without further violence. This point occurs when the 
decision is made that victory has occurred.143 The decision must be backed up 
with evidence, but it is still a decision to declare either victory or defeat. The 
same principle applies for phased victory, with reference to the phases within an 
operation. Based on sensor data, subordinate commander reports, and an 
overall estimation of the situation, the commander makes a decision whether to 
continue or not.144 The high tempo in maritime operations and the challenge of 
fighting in an environment without any possibility to consolidate a victory requires 
a confident commander, fully able to evaluate and decide if the operation was 
successful or not. In British tradition, the commander has an outstanding 
position, which can be illustrated with the following quote from the British  
 
 
                                            
142 Wayne, P Hughes Jr., FLEET TACTICS, Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: U.S. 
Naval Institute, 1986), 33. 
143 Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War Ends & Means (N.Y: Basic Books inc. 
Publishers 1989), 243. 
144 United States U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations 
(Washington, D.C., 2011) II-4. 
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Maritime Doctrine: “Once appointed in command, commanding officers in the 
Royal Navy, regardless of rank, are known as the Captain—and the Captain is 
the ship.”145 
The captain decides. Evaluation is focused on the lessons-learned 
process and can be carried out well after the action has taken place. 
C. CONTEMPORARY MARITIME PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
1. Contemporary Maritime Principles 
The end of the cold war left navies around the world in a vacuum. High 
seas battles between navies were suddenly reduced in importance and a need to 
shift focus was apparent. Naval fighting, however, did not come to a full stop. It 
moved closer to shore and intertwined with actions on land. From this turmoil, an 
adjusted approach emerged on how to use maritime power in the changed world 
order. The focus has shifted to littoral warfare and the use of the maritime 
domain to reinforce other domains and to uphold good order at sea. These 
changes have opened up interesting adjustments in concepts of operations that 
might be beneficial to use in an information environment. Geoffrey Till has 
illustrated the new general concept operations for Navies post-cold war, as 
shown in Figure 7. 
 
                                            
145 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10, British Maritime 
Doctrine (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2011), 3–8. 
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Figure 7. Maritime concept of operation post–Cold War146 
This new concept is an adaption of the changed political, strategic and 
geographical conditions that is the framework for a nation’s navy. Success in 
maritime operations is still defined as the ability to use the maritime domain for 
one’s own purposes, or successfully obstructing the enemy from doing so, i.e., 
establish and maintain sea control. Ships and their armament have not shifted in 
design overnight, even though there are trends pointing in the direction of smaller 
ships that are more capable in littoral combat. The development of command and 
control systems and sensors in all three dimensions, providing the ship with 
much improved situational awareness, has not changed the commander’s unique 
position as the sole decision-maker. Overall, established attributes for a navy to 
succeed have not disappeared. What is changed is the way operations will most 
likely be conducted. 
                                            
146 From: Geoffrey Till, Seapower A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass 







































2. Arena Transformation  
War is uncertainty. Even with all the new information technology, satellite 
surveillance and new sensor technology, it will continue to be uncertain.147 Battle 
space dominance is never complete. It is a relative term and all is in the eye of 
the beholder.148 It has been so for traditional warfare and it can be anticipated it 
will be valid for information operations as well. Maritime concepts of operations 
are solidly based on centuries of naval warfare. One way to simplify information 
operations planning and execution could be to use the maritime concepts of 
operations and apply them to the information environment. This would increase 
the recognition factor and facilitate integration and understanding for those 
lacking expertise in planning and executing information operations, providing a 
better understanding of the benefits and challenges to be attained by 
implementing them. 
In terms of how doctrines discuss determination of success, the maritime 
domain and the information environments deviate from each other. The maritime 
domain focuses on timely evaluations and the decisions on claiming success or 
failure are ultimately in the hand of the captain, based on both our own and the 
adversary’s actions. Conversely, the information environment typically relies on 
post-action evaluation, where the focus is almost entirely on the adversary’s 
reaction. The power assigned to the commander in the maritime domain to 
decide success or failure is not as prevalent in current information operations 
doctrines. Instead, evaluation teams carry out the process. According to the 
Swedish Doctrine for Information Operations: “Success is valued by the 
information operation cell with support of several other sections of the staff.”149 
                                            
147 Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War Ends & Means (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 
68. 
148 Stuart Albert and Edward C Luck, On the Endings of Wars (Port Washington, NY: 
Kennikat Press Corporation, 1980), 69. 
149 Sweden Försvarsmakten, Handbok Informationsoperationer (Stockholm, HKV, M7739–
352014, 2008) (Author’s translation). 
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Transferring maritime concepts of operations should include the transfer of 
the outstanding position of the commander. This would strengthen the position of 
and return the ultimate decision of mission accomplished to the information 
commander. The transfer of arena should also include an application of the 
maritime concept of operation. Figure 8 shows a first draft of how a modified 
concept of operations could be applied onto the information environment: 
 
Figure 8. Sketches for information concept of operations 
3. General Concept of Information Operations 
The “Information Power Source” consists of a commander’s available 
information resources. Information power can then be applied in one or several of 
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The three main blocks interact with each other and can be applied together or 
individually. The center column can be interpreted as the Commander’s Intent 
and later on into the planning process as the Mission Statement. The dotted 
block to the right contains information operations capabilities, described in Table 
2. It represents all the tools available in order to achieve the objectives for the 
information operation. 
a. Information Control 
In alignment with maritime terminology, information control can be 
divided into two categories: establishing and disputing information control. 
b. Establish Information Control 
The goal for information control is to establish rules of engagement 
for both our own and as well as the adversary’s use of a defined information 
space. Information control differs from information superiority, that aims to 
establish absolute control: you either have superiority or not; the term control can 
be graded in order to create realistic and achievable goals for information 
operations. Note that if a current situation would permit absolute control there 
would be no difference between superiority and control. The reason to propose a 
terminology that is less constrained is to address conflict’s inherent ambiguous 
properties, more commonly referred to as the fog of war, friction and chaos.150 
This is especially valid in information operations, where the cognitive domain has 
a central position, and where responses to influential activities are not always 
rational or easy to predict. Furthermore, information control is neither offensive 
nor defensive. It can be carried out for offensive purposes, i.e., when applying 
military force in a new direction, and it can be applied in defensive operations,  
 
 
                                            
150 United Kingdom, The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Joint Doctrine Publictation 01, 
Second Edition, Campaigning (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2008), 1–2. 
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i.e., defending one’s own territory. The term control must be, with reference to 
Till’s five factors for sea control, associated with several thresholds before 
released to the units: 
 Who 
o If possible, assign the foreseeable units needed to 
carry out the task. 
o Pinpoint the core capabilities needed to carry out the 
task. 
 What 
o Narrow down the task. 
o What are the objectives? 
o Apply constraints and restraints. 
 When 
o It is necessary to deploy time limits for the operation. 
o  It is especially crucial to determine how long 
information control must remain in place. Information 
control should not be assigned with the caveat: “until 
further notice.” 
o Where 
o Specify the area of operations. This area can both be 
a physical as well as an logical area of operation i.e., 
 Maps showing area of operations. 
 Specify target audiences. 
 Frequency constraints. 
 Media constraints, i.e., which media sources 
shall remain free from influence and which 
must be controlled, censored or even silenced. 
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 Why 
o The purpose of establishing information control must 
be specified 
Establishing information control is accomplished by using a 
selection of, or all, information resources to both conduct operations inside the 
information environment as well as influence the other domains from the 
information environment. The naval requirements to include both concentrations 
of power as well as tactical and operational skills in order to succeed should as 
valid when establishing control in the information environment. Electronic warfare 
is an example of an operation inside the information environment. Military 
deception is an example of an operation aimed at influencing the overall decision 
processes of an adversary force.  
c. Disputing Information Control 
As previously discussed, disputing control is a method used when 
one side is inferior in force strength and cannot foresee the possibility of 
establishing control, but still aims to challenge the superior force. Disputing 
control can be carried out by transmitting radio into areas where the other side 
claims control or by other means with the aim to challenge the information flow in 
the area of operations. An example of disputing control is Radio Free Europe, 
which broadcast news and features to countries behind the Iron Curtain during 
the Cold War.151 Another example could be to hack into the adversary’s systems 
and introduce malicious software in their computers and command and control 
systems, with the aim to aggravate the adversary’s command and control 
capability. The lack of situational awareness due to poor functioning command 
and control systems can then be exploited by one’s own units with informational 
or kinetic capabilities.  
                                            
151 Cissie Dore Hill, “Voices of Hope: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty” 
October 30, 2001, 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6270  
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d. Information Power Projection 
Information power projection aims at using the information 
environment to influence the other domains. The purpose is to weaken an 
adversary’s decision-making capabilities, to reinforce our own efforts and to 
create synergetic effects. This can be done by disturbing decision processes, 
changing behaviors so that the adversary is easier to find, identify, and eliminate. 
Another objective is to change the attitude of the adversary civilian population 
and to create a favorable attitude towards our own forces. 
e. Good Order in the Information Environment 
This is a principle that can be applied over the entire conflict scale. 
Its objective is to make sure the information environment in the area of 
operations is functioning properly. This is focused primarily on operations other 
than war where the knowledge and experience of information operations 
personnel can be used to establish a free press, reinstall civilian radio stations or 
by other means establish an information flow in a post-war situation in the area of 
operations. An important function in a free society is an independent media and it 
is crucial to establish free press if you want to build peace in a post-conflict area. 
This can also be construed to be a function of information assurance and cyber 
defense, where “outlaw” elements that wish to hack into systems and create 
havoc are deterred or prevented from doing so. 
4. Why Use the Proposed Information Concept of Operations 
There are two main purposes for application of an already established 
concept of operations. The first is to benefit from a different process of 
determining success in information operations. The second is the recognition 
factor that simplifies understanding of the information environment. Personnel 
who are not familiar with information operations can better relate to a very 
complex environment if expressions and a concept of operations are made 
understandable by borrowing from a familiar domain. Planning is the art of trying 
to achieve objectives with as little effort as possible. It is always a compromise 
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between objectives, resources and time available. If the “rookie” user of the 
information environment can benefit from already existing procedures, they can 
facilitate the planning process and create a higher acceptance to encompass 
information operations into the overall operation. 
The implementation of a standardized concept of information operations 
can facilitate the identification and issuance of appropriate objectives for the 
operation. Using general concepts of operations also facilitates interpretation of 
received situation reports, sensor data and subordinate commander’s estimates. 
The general concepts of operation are the structural backbone created to help 
relate the incoming information to an evaluation of how the operation is 
proceeding. This would make it easier to timely measure the fulfillment of 
objectives, and therefore know if success is achieved or not.  
In alignment with the outstanding position of a navy commander, the final 
decision to declare success or failure would be transferred from an evaluation 
group to the information operations commander, a position every information 
officer should be trained, prepared and eager to take.152 This also enables the 
commander to decide when the situation is satisfying153 enough to declare 
mission accomplished instead of waiting for a maximized outcome, which might 
never occur.154 Measurements of performance and effectiveness would still be 
important to evaluate, but not to determine success. Instead, they would serve as 
the core of a crucial lessons-learned process to continuously improve the 
capability to carry out successful information operations. 
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V. FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. LOOP BACK TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 This final chapter will briefly discuss the results of the thesis in 
correlation with the research question and the added sub-
questions, with the aim to make sure that the questions are 
answered:What is success in military operations? 
In order to understand the fundamentals of the research question, the 
discussion started with analyzing what success is in general warfare. The results 
of the analysis were then used in the search for the answer of what success is in 
information operations. The discussion concluded that: 
Success in information operations is a favorable level of fulfillment 
of related objectives on all levels of war, either isolated or orchestrated in 
combined efforts. 
 How is success determined in information operations? 
The answer to the question is discussed in section 4.1.2, and the 
conclusion is that, according to the U.S., British, and Swedish doctrines, success 
is determined by using post-action evaluation. In the planning process, the 
objectives and tasks for an information operation are transformed into desired 
effects. During the evaluation, a desired effect is paired with the performance 
carried out in order to reach the effect and these two entities are measured. The 
thesis discusses several challenges connected to this approach and the 
conclusion is that this process is only capable of providing measures of 
effectiveness long after the action has occurred.  
The literature used does not propose any solutions or standardized 
processes on how to systematically predict success in information operations, 
which is concluded to be crucial before engaging with one’s own units. Simply 
put, without an accurate estimation it is impossible to assign sufficient resources 
and to use one’s own forces economically and efficiently.  
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 With regard to the environmental similarities between the maritime 
and the information environments, can general concepts of naval 
theory be used when determining success in information 
operations? 
In order to answer the question, the maritime environment and the 
purpose of naval warfare were analyzed. Based on the results of the analysis, 
the general concepts of naval operations were transformed and adjusted to fit the 
information environment. The result was then analyzed with emphasis on why 
the proposed application could be beneficial when planning and executing 
information operations. 
Even though this study must be viewed as an initial attempt to revise the 
theoretical approach to information operations, and must be analyzed much more 
thoroughly before any practical tests, it shows that there can be positive 
synergetic effects when “borrowing” and using already established procedures 
from traditional domains. This also provides a final issue to be addressed as to 
the question of what is success in information operations: if the outcome of an 
information operation can be determined without time constraints, then the 
present method is good enough. If the need for timely and even predictive results 
is prevalent, then there might be a need to adjust current methods. 
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B. AREAS OF INTEREST AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
The directions for future work have already been mentioned and are 
repeated here for emphasis: 
 Deepened analysis of the present thesis results with the emphasis 
on studying the effects of implementing a concept of operations 
from another domain on the information environment. 
 Develop an adjusted version of U.S. Joint Publication 3-13, 
“Information Operations,” with a general concept of operations 
included in the doctrine as presented in the present thesis. Similar 
adjustments should be made to the British and Swedish doctrinal 
publications. 
 Carry out practical experiments in order to evaluate this new 
approach in comparison with that now existing. 
All of the above suggestions aim at either rejecting or consolidating the 
findings of this study. 
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